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Abstract Industrial policy has been a cornerstone of economic policy in Europe after the
world war and the transformation of basic industries like coal and steel were key issues at
the beginning of European integration. In the 1970s and 1990s industrial policy shifted
toward support of high-tech industries. In the seventies the importance of a more systemic
view came up, policy had to address the specific weaknesses of the innovation system. The
Lisbon agenda finally combines competitiveness with social and environmental goals.
Industry plays an important role in generating welfare and industrial policy is in different
forms and sorts back, high on the agenda.
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1 Introduction
There is probably not one concept in the economic policy field which raises today so much
controversy as industrial policy. As Pack and Saggi (2006) e.g. observe in their recent
survey of industrial policy: “Few phrases elicit such strong reactions from economists and
policy makers as industrial policy”. There are many reasons for this, not in the least the
changing global political environment with the end of the Cold War and the ensuing much
wider acceptance in national policy circles, not just in small countries, of an increased
reliance on the international trading and exchange in goods and services. Industrial policy at
least in the definition used here: structural policies designed to strengthen the efficiency,
scale and international competitiveness of domestic industrial sectors, typically contains an
element of national champion, of self-reliance in bringing about economic growth and
development. Not surprisingly, the concept was particularly popular in early post-war
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Europe and appears today particularly popular in emerging economies, and to a lesser
extent some of the new European member states. In this short article we enter in some more
details in the underlying analytical underpinnings of this fall and rise in popularity in
industrial policy1.
Industrial policy became rapidly one of the corner stones of economic policy in the early
post-war period with the need felt in many national policy circles, and most notably in those
economies which had been most devastated by the war, to support a more rapid structural
transformation of their economies towards internationally stronger, large industrial sectors
and complexes. In Europe, it included alongside the traditional heavy, capital and scale
intensive industrial sectors such as coal and steel mining—the European Coal and Steel
Community (created in Paris in 1952 and dismantled (formally integrated in the EC) in
2001)—also the agricultural sector with the development of national, and in the case of
Europe, a Common Agricultural Policy. Over time with the subsequent GATT rounds of
international trade liberalisation, industrial policy became much more dominated by the
need to assist the international “adjustment”, as it was called euphemistically, of an
increasing number of sectors: from the old coal and steal mining sectors to more traditional
labour intensive sectors suffering increasingly from increased international competition,
such as clothing and textiles, assisting those sectors by providing financial support for
mergers, job displacement and cross-border integration. Viewed ex post, it might well be
argued that the absolute height of belief in the virtues of a European as opposed to national
industrial policy, was the development under the auspices of the European Roundtable of
Industrialists (created in 1983) of the so-called Europe 1992 Single Market, resulting with
the removal of internal trade barriers in further inter-sectoral shifts in various manufacturing
sectors amongst European countries and as a consequence European industrial specialisa-
tion2 and increased international competitiveness. In a first section, we turn to some of the
modern economic arguments in favour of such industrial policies as exposed for instance in
some of earlier work, as summarized in Dosi et al. (1990).
In a second section, we broaden the analysis away from the strong sectoral focus of
industrial policy towards the much broader notion of innovation policy as it became
developed over the last twenty years and gradually rose to popularity in the run up to the
Lisbon summit in March 2000. Today innovation has actually emerged as one of the most
popular economic terms; as often used on the Internet as the concept of GDP as a search on
Google Trends illustrates3. This shift in focus cannot be seen independently from the major
shifts in the world economy and in particular the much greater readiness to rely on “abroad”
to bring about domestic structural change, whether under the form of international trade
competition of foreign direct investment, mergers or acquisitions. At the same time the
large national champions themselves have gradually transformed into truly “multinational”
companies with increasingly multi-national, as opposed to national interests. This holds
both for developed countries as well as for many emerging countries. It explains amongst
others the eagerness with which the latter have become members of the WTO. In short, the
predominance over the last 15 years, of the absolute faith in the benefits of international
markets, capital and technology flows as the means of allocating sectoral resources cannot
be seen outside of the broader context of the fundamental changes in the global political,
1If there is one concept in economics which seems to fit well the old BBC comedy The Fall and Rise of
Reginald Perrin (Nobbs 1976), it is probably industrial policy.
2In saying so I do not want to belittle the trade creation effects of Europe 1992, see a.o. Sapir (1995).
3See e.g. Freeman and Soete (2007) where the similarity in frequency use between R&D and productivity
and innovation and GDP were noted.
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institutional and technological environment which took place over the same period. It is
within this context that we discuss in Section 2 the emergence of innovation policy as a
much broader policy framework bringing to the forefront the local systemic features
anchoring so to say nationally industrial production.
We conclude with some speculative thoughts on what all this might mean for the design
and future development of industrial policy. From something with a distinct negative
connotation in the 1980s often resulting from some spectacular particular cases of policy
failures, industrial policy under its new form of innovation policy seems to open up new
policy priorities: e.g. in the design of appropriate eco-innovation as well as social welfare
policies in both the developed and emerging economy world.
2 The 1970s and 1980s: from low to high-tech industrial policy
The early erosion in popularity of traditional industrial policy in the seventies had of course
much to do with the bad press such policies were getting both in terms of the many failures
of the restructured sectors and companies whereby the policy-designed aid support schemes
seemed incapable of bringing about improvements in the competitiveness of such sectors/
firms and second were strongly resisted by those workers loosing their jobs as a direct
consequence of the structural adjustment policies put in place. The latter job displacement
was of course not just the result of increased international competition but also of the
continuous technological improvements resulting in a more or less natural decline of
manufacturing as share of either GDP or total employment. This deindustrialisation process
was associated with the further transformation of advanced countries into more service
oriented economies due to the faster growth of productivity in manufacturing than in
services.
In the case of Europe, this deindustrialisation process posed more significant adjustment
problems because of the particularly poor capacity of European economies to renew their
industrial activities as a result of regulatory and political fragmentation. The lack of a
harmonized European military sector, heavily dependent on public “high tech” procure-
ment, took even away one of the few politically based arguments in favour of an active
European industrial policy. Even today the lack of a truly European (as opposed to national)
public procurement programme is often considered4 to be at the centre of Europe’s lack of
industrial renewal. With an EU budget ceiling of 1 to 1.27%, it is of course difficult to have
a European public procurement programme, whether it is in defence, so-called Trans-
European infrastructural networks or any other public utility sector.
The political awareness of having to shift industrial policy from its negative, job
reducing image towards a more dynamic, “sun rise” image was of course very much
inspired by the success of Japan in rapidly catching up in many industrial sectors from
motor vehicles to semiconductors in the 1970s and really 1980s. At the political level, the
US-Japanese semiconductor trade agreement, providing breeding space to the US industry,
became one of the most clear cut examples of what appeared to become the example of a
new form of strategic industrial/trade policy with major long term implications for the
competitiveness of the US semiconductor industry. Hence not surprising, in Europe too, the
strategic nature of industrial policy became its new justification. From an analytical point of
view three different definitions of strategic became popular in the industrial policy
literature: a technological one, a trade one and an industrial cluster one.
4See e.g. the Aho report from 2006.
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The first definition of “strategic” was most closely connected to the political
interpretation of the term “strategic”: access to some products or technologies would
contain a long term strategic advantage. This more ‘military’ oriented notion of strategic
was probably most clearly reflected in the attempt by the US to prevent the export of
“strategic” high tech products to communist countries at the time of the Soviet Union.
However, and as also illustrated in the lack of success of such Concom policies in the
1980s, it is not immediately obvious why high tech products would fall under the category
of strategic products, certainly not when compared for instance to scarce natural resources
of which world resources are concentrated in a number of particular countries. To the extent
that new inventions and innovations are continuously subject to “creative destruction” and
that knowledge is difficult to contain within firms and countries, new scientific and
technological breakthroughs and the international diffusion of technology are likely to be
major factors in rendering strategic high tech products relatively quickly obsolete. The case
of high tech products was in other words closely based on the dominance of cumulative,
increasing return features of technological advance5. For many of the most significant
technologies of that time, the most typical example being microelectronics, access or better
the existence of a national technological capability was considered essential for the
successful transfer and effective use of technology.
The couple of high tech products which fall under this first “strategic” heading were in
other words strategic in that they had an out of proportion importance in terms of their
“pervasiveness”, e.g., they were essential “raw material” or intermediate technological input
in many capital and final consumer products, and that there were strong cumulative and
increasing return features involved in the development of such technologies. National and
supra-national technology policies have very much focussed on such products. One may
think of the VLSI, Sematech6 and Jessi support programmes in Japan, the US or Europe.
The second notion of “strategic” increasingly used in the policy arena was the one
developed in “new” trade theory by academics like Krugman (1986) and others. The
argument was primarily economic, but again based on a notion of increasing returns. These
were however more directly associated with the actual production of the products being
traded internationally. The resulting international concentration of production of particular
products in some regions/countries and not in others, would raise the possibility for
“strategic” intervention, i.e. the initial stimulus to get the static and dynamic increasing
returns under way within the region/country before any other region/country would do the
same thing. The problem here was of course that if everybody were to develop such
“strategic” policies, no one would any more reap the benefits of the scale and
agglomeration economies which in theory justified such policies. From a dynamic point
of view however, and following some of the subsequent “new” growth contributions in this
area the picture became much more complicated. The regional or national externalities
linked to the strategic product or sector could have a significant impact on growth,
justifying in a more systematic way policy support for such strategic sectors. But, as
contributions in the area of growth and trade illustrated, the success of such strategic
policies would crucially depend on the efficiency of the dynamic sector (R&D sector) in
one country compared to another. What is strategic in one country could well be anything
but strategic in another. Furthermore as soon as some of the “creative destruction” feature
of new technological breakthroughs and diffusion became introduced, no overall conclusion
for “strategic” policy support would emerge any more (Aghion and Howitt 2006).
5See also Dosi et al. 1990.
6See Grindley et al. 1994.
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Trade and industrial support policies for some particular sectors which would differ very
much from country to country could be said to fall under this category. One may think of
European support policies for the aerospace industry. The product or sectoral focus of
industrial policy would be clearly dictated by notions of the region or country’s
comparative or potential comparative advantage. The main practical implementation
problem relates to the delineation of such sectors. No one would probably include any
longer the iron and steel sector under the heading of strategic. It is clear though that both in
theory and in practice the static and dynamic economies of scale have been and still are
significant in this sector.
The third and probably broadest notion of strategic, did underpin directly the raison
d'être of industrial policy going back to some of the early arguments of the 1950s. It could
be best described with reference to the old French notion of “filières”: some sectors had
from a national perspective such essential forward and backward linkages in terms of
material and knowledge in—and outputs, that they had become strategic to the country or
region. The French automobile industry was probably the best illustration of such a sector,
as would be tire making in Clermont Ferrand. One in ten Frenchmen where estimated to be
somehow linked to the production and servicing of motor cars. In this very broad
interpretation of industrial policy, a sector can be said to have become strategic because of
its widespread infiltration of the whole economy through the large amount of vertical
linkages.
All three interpretations of the notion of strategic were thought of highlighting the trade
off between policies directed towards static allocative efficiency and dynamic growth
efficiency. Once concepts such as increasing returns were being introduced, there appeared
nothing in the mechanism leading to static allocative efficiency that would also guarantee
the fulfilment of the criteria of dynamic efficiency. This point had been highlighted by
many international trade and development economists long before 'new' trade and growth
theory brought them in a coherent and formalized way to the attention of national policy
makers. Indeed, if different commodities or sectors presented significant differences in their
“dynamic strategic potential”, for instance in terms of economies of scale, technical
progress, learning-by-doing, etc., international specialisations which appeared efficient in
terms of static comparative advantage criteria could well generate in the long run virtuous
or vicious circles of technological backwardness.
What the debate about “strategic” trade policy in the 1980s brought to the forefront is
that in contrast to the previous literature, arguments about the existence of such possible
trade-offs were more than a special case related to infant industries. They were, once
account was taken of the continuous nature of technological change, with its various
dynamic increasing returns and cumulative features, more likely to be the general condition
of any economic system. In so far as the actual process of production in firms, regions or
countries was closely associated with the existence of technological capabilities in such
firms, regions or countries, mechanisms leading to specialisation in production did also
have a clear and significant dynamic counterpart in that they also would lead to
specialisation in technological skills and capabilities. The potential for such dynamic
technological specialisation would in other words be very much different between
technologies and sectors. The identification and support of "strategic" technologies or
sectors, even though not justified on the basis of static allocative efficiency, could then well
be justified from a dynamic perspective (in terms of long term output and productivity
growth, innovativeness, etc.). Not surprisingly these are the insights which currently find
their biggest application and support in the design of industrial policies in emerging
economies.
J Ind Compet Trade (2007) 7:273–284 277
3 The 1990s: shifting towards more systemic policy views
Over the past ten to fifteen years, there has been a gradual shift in the understanding of the
relationships between research, innovation and socio-economic development. Sectoral
explanations either of the technology push or the demand pull kind have gradually lost in
policy influence. Instead, it is now widely recognised that economic growth and well-being
is founded on a much broader, well-functioning “knowledge and innovation system”, in
which all actors perform well. The concept of a National (or Regional) Innovation System
emerged originally in the late 80’s and was coined by Freeman to describe the much
broader congruence in the Japanese society between all sorts of institutional networks in
both “private and public sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify
and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman 1987). Lundvall, on his side, emphasized in a
broadly similar manner “the elements and relationships which interact in the production,
diffusion and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge... and are either located
within or rooted inside the borders of a nation state” (Lundvall 1992), whereas Nelson
would more specifically focus on the “set of institutions whose interactions determine the
innovative performance of national firms” (Nelson 1993). It clearly put the emphasis away
from the sectoral dimension towards the much broader national institutional framework
within which firms and other organisations operated and which appeared of crucial
importance to the speed, extent and success by which innovations got introduced and
diffused in the economy.
A common feature of all such systems—regional, national and trans-national—was the
fact that firms rarely if ever innovate alone. As those “innovation scholars” had been at
pains to point out for many years there is need for a constant interaction and co-operation
between the innovating firm and its external environment, which in the optimal case leads
to a virtuous learning circle of better exploitation of available knowledge. As Richard
Nelson (1993) noted: “to orient R&D fruitfully, one needs detailed knowledge of its
strengths and weaknesses and areas where improvements would yield big payoffs and this
type of knowledge tends to reside with those who use the technology, generally firms and
their customers and suppliers. In addition, over time firms in an industry tend to develop
capabilities . . . largely based on practice.”
The fact that the national innovation systems of countries would show marked
differences, associated with their individual paths of specialisation in production, had of
course also obvious policy implications. External intervention could indeed be desirable or
even necessary but had to be informed by local conditions and based on the study of
innovation processes, organisations and institutions and their interactions over relatively
extended periods. It became crucial to identify which elements of the system were subject
to inertia so that particular deficiencies could be addressed. Authors in the national systems
of innovations literature tradition would refer to the “dynamic co-evolution of knowledge,
innovations, organisations and institutions”. From a systemic perspective, it is often the
weakest chain, which is the most critical one for economic growth and development, and
hence also for policy intervention.
The idea that there is something to learn from institutional arrangements and policies in
other, more “advanced” environments, as exemplified in the subsequent European focus on
the knowledge gap with the US, and that systematic comparative studies would be a useful
tool in this respect, was of course also not a new one. Alexander Gerschenkron pioneered
this kind of comparative country study. As he pointed out, some countries are at the
technological frontier, while others lag far behind. Although the technological gap between
the frontier country and the laggard would represent “a great promise” for the latter (a
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potential for higher growth through imitating frontier technologies), there were also various
problems that would prevent backward countries from reaping the potential benefits to the
full. Gerschenkron actually argued that if one country succeeded in embarking on an
innovation-driven growth path, others might find it increasingly difficult to catch up. His
favourite example was Germany’s attempt to catch up with Britain a century ago. When
Britain industrialized, technology was relatively labour intensive and small scale. But in the
course of time technology became more capital and scale intensive, so when Germany
entered the scene, the conditions for entry had changed considerably. Because of this,
Gerschenkron argued, Germany had to develop new institutional instruments for
overcoming these obstacles, above all in the financial sector, “instruments for which there
was little or no counterpart in an established industrial country” (Gershenkron 1962). He
held these experiences to be valid also for other technologically lagging countries7.
In this context Abramovitz (1986) had introduced also, already in the 1950s, the notions
of technological congruence and social capability to discuss what he called the “absorptive
capacity” of late-comers. The concept of technological congruence referred to the degree to
which leader and follower country characteristics were congruent in areas such as market
size, factor supply, etc. The concept of social capability pointed to the various efforts and
capabilities that backward countries possessed in order to catch up, such as improving
education, infrastructure and technological capabilities (R&D facilities, etc.). He explained
the successful catching up of Western Europe vis-à-vis the USA in the post-war period as
the result of both increasing technological congruence and improved social capabilities. As
an example of the former he mentioned explicitly how European economic integration led
to the creation of larger and more homogenous markets in Europe, facilitating the transfer
of scale-intensive technologies initially developed for US conditions. Improved social
capabilities on the other hand were reflected in such other factors as the general increase in
educational levels, the rise in the share of resources devoted to public and private sector
R&D and the success of the financial system in mobilizing resources for change. In a
similar vein the failure of many developing countries to exploit the same opportunities is
commonly accounted for by their lack of technological congruence and missing social
capabilities (e.g. education, financial system).
The point here is that concepts such as “technological congruence” and “social
capability” appear to be important policy notions which might be helpful in addressing the
systemic “success” or “failure” of science, technology and innovation policies. But the
notions and concepts developed originally by Gerschenkron and Abramovitz provide an
even stronger policy handle than originally thought by national systems of innovation
theorists. As highlighted elsewhere (Soete 2005), four factors appear at the outset essential
for the functioning of a national system of innovation and could be considered as the
essential features to bear in mind when designing appropriate innovation policies.
First there is the investment of the country in social and human capital: the cement, one
may argue, that holds the knowledge and innovation systems together. It is incorporated in
a number of knowledge generating institutions in the public as well as the private sector
such as universities, polytechnics and other skills’ training schools. Social and human
capital is of course also likely to be involved in the creation of new innovations and the
diffusion of those innovations throughout the economic system. With the development of
‘new growth’ models in the economics literature, the role of education and learning in
continuously generating, replacing and feeding new technology and innovation has
7For a more in depth analysis of these historical contributions to modern catching up growth theory see
Fagerberg (2002).
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received much more emphasis8 over the last decade. An initial stock of human capital in a
previous period is likely to generate innovation growth and productivity effects,
downstream as well as upstream with lots of ‘spill-overs’ and positive ‘externalities’,
affecting other firms, regions and countries.
Higher education is itself crucial for the continuous feeding of fundamental and applied
research. Many new growth models have tried to build in a more complex fashion such
impacts, giving prime importance not just to education itself, but also to its by-products
such as research and innovation. The second central node of any system of innovation is
hence not surprisingly the research capacity of a country or region and the way it is closely
intertwined with the country’s higher education system. From a typical “national”
innovation system perspective, such close interaction appears important; from an
international perspective the links might be much looser, with universities and research
institutions being capable of attracting talent world wide.
In most technology growth models, these two nodes form the essential “dynamo effects”
(Dosi 1988) or “yeast” and “mushroom” effects (Harberger 1998) implicit in the notion of
technological change. Knowledge and human capital act like yeast to increase productivity
relatively evenly across the economy, while other factors such as a technological
breakthrough or discovery suddenly mushroom to increase productivity more dramatically
in some sectors than others.
The third “node” holding knowledge together within the framework of a national system
of innovation is, maybe surprisingly, geographical proximity. The regional clustering of
industrial activities based on the close interactions between suppliers and users, involving
learning networks of various sorts between firms and between public and private players,
represents a more flexible and dynamic organisational set-up than the organisation of such
learning activities confined within the contours of individual firms. Regional or local
learning networks can allow for much more intensive information flows, mutual learning
and economies of scale amongst firms, private and public knowledge institutions, education
establishments, etc. Some innovation management authors (Chesbrough 2003) like to refer
here to the notion of “open innovation”. The technological and innovative performance of
firms is what can be most directly measured to approximate the degree of success of such
clustering.
In a well-known study Putnam (2000) compares the impact of Silicon Valley and Route
128 in the US. He cites Silicon Valley in California where a group of entrepreneurs, helped
by research effort in the local universities, contributed to the development of a world centre
of advanced technology. As he puts it: ‘The success is due largely to the horizontal
networks of informal and formal cooperation that developed among fledgling companies in
the area’. By contrast, in the Route 128 corridor outside Boston, lack of inter-firm social
capital has led to a more traditional form of corporate hierarchy, secrecy, self-sufficiency,
and territoriality. The comparison shows that the innovativeness and technological
performance of firms strongly depends on close interaction between them.
In addition to human capital, research and the related phenomenon of local networks,
and particularly inter-firm networking, the fourth and last notion essential to any innovation
system approach is the ‘absorptive capacity’ of firms, clients and consumers in a particular
region or country. The ability of companies to learn will of course in first instance depend
on their internal capabilities represented by the number and level of scientifically and
technologically qualified staff. Firms must do enough R&D to be economically dynamic
and to have the ‘absorptive capacity’ to conduct a professional dialogue with the public
8See Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) and a more recent exploration by Vandenbussche et al. (2006).
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research sector and other external sources of knowledge. At the same time, consumers,
clients, and citizens might be very open to new designs, products, even ideas, enabling
rapid diffusion of such new products created by R&D in knowledge-intensive sectors, or
very conservative, resistant to change and suspicious of novelty. The absorptive capacity
amongst countries, regions, even suburbs, varies dramatically.
Schematically Figure 1 illustrates the growth dynamics associated with such an ideal,
virtual national innovation system: the four key nodes suggested here can be represented in
a simple taxonomic way, opposing the relative importance given in science, technology and
innovation policy to supply versus demand on the one hand and users versus creators
factors on the other. Supply will generally be dominated by public resources, demand by
private resources. The focus on users will be generally characterized by broad, economy
wide features, reflecting the impact of the diffusion of technologies; the focus on creators
will be generally more specific. The four key elements suggested above can be represented
as elements of a virtual circle mutually reinforcing each other with in the end a positive
overall impact on competitiveness and sustainable growth. From this perspective, it is in the
interactions between these four constituents that the most interesting and efficient set of
science, technology and innovation policy initiatives can be found.
4 Conclusions
The last 60 years has seen a major shift in the recognition amongst policy makers about the
usefulness and effectiveness of industrial policy. We highlighted in the introduction the
importance of the global political, economic and technological transformations which took
place worldwide since the fall of the Berlin wall. No doubt there is also a close relationship
between the effectiveness of industrial policy and a country’s level of development.
Advanced countries have all witnessed over the 90’s an acceleration in the process of
deindustrialisation with a more rapid growth in services following the diffusion of
information and communication technologies (Petit and Soete 2001). The dominance of the
industrial sector remains of course structurally very different between countries such as
Germany or France from countries such as the UK or The Netherlands. Not surprisingly the
































Fig. 1 A national system of
innovation taxonomy
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biggest economic concerns with respect to deindustrialisation emerge from the large
countries, which are still dominated by strong industrial presence, such as France and
Germany. But probably more interesting in this context are the cases of small countries
which have witnessed rapid deindustrialisation over the 1990s but at the same time,
nevertheless witnessed rapid growth in the industrial value added per worker, such as
Austria or Finland. The upgrading and industrial renewal has been relatively successful in
those countries even if it has failed to provide sufficient new employment opportunities to
completely offset the deindustrialisation trend. The growth in industrial productivity,
however, was sufficient to redistribute part of such gains for employment growth in service
sectors and other low productivity social services. At the other spectrum countries such as
Germany or The Netherlands, witnessed most typically the Baumol Effect9 with relatively
low productivity growth associated with the further rise in service activities but strong
employment growth in the 1990s. Whether such a trend is sustainable is highly
questionable, as recent evidence illustrates. In emerging countries, similar trends have
taken place but as yet less well noted. As Kaplinsky (2005) has shown there are
increasingly also signs of deindustrialisation in countries such as China and India.
Since Lisbon though, there is broad recognition though that a sectoral focus on
international competitiveness needs ultimately to be complemented by a much broader look
at the systemic “congruence” between various other policy domains which are of particular
relevance to the nation or in the case of Lisbon, European growth and industrial dynamics.
The relevant policy term coined here is, as we discussed in section 2, the national system of
innovation. Over the last ten to twenty years the institutional matching between the various
components of such countries’ national system of innovation has become gradually weaker,
not in the least because of the globalisation pressures, which have acted differently on each
of those components. In a recent paper (Soete 2005), I have dubbed the growing mismatch
between the key public and private knowledge components of the national system of
innovation, the “Dutch knowledge disease”10 From this perspective the innovation policy
focus should be on the “crowding in” in Europe of such knowledge based activities both in
the private and public sector.
This being said, the contribution of an internationally competitive industrial sector
remains a crucial asset for economic growth and more broadly social welfare. A rapidly
growing industrial sector as in many emerging economies provides major opportunities for
social re-distributional policies and for addressing the problems of urban and rural poverty
and inequality. A declining industrial sector in advanced countries by contrast, responsible
for the biggest component of economic welfare (as measured through value added per
worker) in an economy, will raise questions about the sustainability of such countries’
social and welfare models. It remains therefore somewhat of a paradox that at a time that
emerging economies are discovering the benefits of industrial policy, the concept has
basically disappeared from the official policy language in some advanced countries.
Turning to the future, it seems that one of the central policy questions in the rich,
advanced country world, is to what extent industry can continue to play its role as
9See Baumol and Bowen’s 1966 work and, for instance, also Inklaar et al. (2007).
10The phenomenon of “Dutch knowledge disease” (Soete 2005), highlights a lack of knowledge renewal in
both industrial and services sectors based on a dual phenomenon of “crowding out”. First, a crowding out of
basic research in the private sector, with for instance many domestic champions having drastically, under
international pressure, cut back their own privately funded fundamental research activities. And, secondly, a
crowding out of more applied and market driven research in universities as a result of domestic competition
putting a strong premium on academic, basic research.
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frontrunner in such areas as the environment and social conditions within an increasingly
competitive environment without a strong domestic industrial policy. There is already today
a large gap between the environmental awareness, introduction of environmental-friendly
technologies (end-of pipeline and clean technologies) in industry and the same awareness
and diffusion of such goods with final consumers. The emissions of industry have in some
areas been substantially reduced and are now subject to emissions schemes providing
internal incentives schemes for further reduction in, e.g., CO2 emissions. By contrast the
results on the consumer side have been much less impressive. At the moment, it could even
be argued that when the consumer enters the factory as worker/employee he enters an
environmentally more sophisticated and fine tuned world than when he gets back at home.
The consumer’s lagging awareness of environmental issues has as a consequence created a
gap with the demand for environmental friendly products. The question can be raised how
long European industry will be able to maintain such a front running position in a less
environmentally friendly regulated world market with too few domestic consumers ready to
contribute in their consumption behaviour to the additional costs. The same argument holds
for the social conditions. Here too enterprises (not just industry) are being forced to behave
as frontrunners in a socially sophisticated way, providing social provisions, working
conditions, human resources and training, by which they become as if it were model places:
islands of well regulated and controlled social conditions. Outside of the enterprise
environment, citizens are increasingly confronted with insecurity, abuse, lack of social
contacts, declining family values, etc.
In short, industry will continue to play a strong role in generating welfare both in rich
and poor countries. In doing so industry in the advanced countries, and in particular in
Europe, has been an engine of progress way beyond the dramatic increase in material
progress it generated in post-war Europe but bringing about also the means to achieve
social progress. With increased globalisation, one can only hope that industry will be an
engine for the spreading of social progress, environmentally friendly technologies and eco-
innovations world wide. Industrial policy in different forms and sorts is back, high on the
agenda.
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